Alienage Jurisdiction Over Stateless Corporations: Revealing the Folly of Matimak Trading Company v. Khalily by unknown
Alienage Jurisdiction Over Stateless
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States of America will enter the new millennium as the
business leader of the world, but for how long will it be able to maintain
this position? If the final years of the twentieth century are an indication
of things to come, it is apparent that geographical and political borders
will become even more irrelevant to the scope of business transactions.
The increase in the number of offshore corporations' doing business on
an international scale is evidence that the world's business leaders will
readily change their locale in order to increase profits. Increasingly
popular offshore jurisdictions, such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, the
British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands, offer many business
advantages to corporations that conduct their operations on an
international scale.2 The number of business transactions involving
parties from the United States and these offshore corporations will
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1. "Offshore corporations" refers to corporations located outside of the United
States.
2. These jurisdictions have been incredibly popular because they serve a
multitude of diverse corporate needs, including an absence of income, corporate or
capital gains tax, political stability, minimal governmental interference, well-developed
infrastructures and telecommunications systems, well-developed banking systems,
educated work forces, and familiar legal systems and laws. See Harold I. Steinbach &
Heath A. Grayson, Taxing? Hardly: Locating a Business in a Tax-Free Jurisdiction, 7
Bus. LAW TODAY 33, 33-34 (1997); see also David D. Beazer, The Mystique of "Going
Offshore," 9 UTAH B. J. 19 (1996).
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continue to increase as the global economy grows. One unavoidable
consequence of increased interaction between citizens of the United
States and these foreign businesses will be an increase in legal disputes
involving parties from foreign countries. Often, the foreign party may
wish to have the dispute heard in the federal courts of the United States.
If foreign parties find that they lack access to a federal forum, they may
be less inclined to conduct business with the citizens of the United
States. Alternatively, if a U.S. company discovers that it would not be
able to enforce its legal rights against a foreign party in the federal
courts, it may limit the scope of its international transactions to more
stable, though less profitable, endeavors. Therefore, if the United States
wishes to maintain its status as a leader in international business, it
should consider removing any obstacles that deny foreign parties access
to a federal forum.
Many disputes arising out of international transactions are contractual
in nature and thus do not raise a federal question! Therefore, foreign
litigants who wish to be heard in the federal courts need to establish the
presence of alienage jurisdiction. Alienage jurisdiction, an aspect of
diversity jurisdiction,4 is the original subject matter jurisdiction federal
district courts have over controversies between United States citizens
and foreign citizens or subjects. A clear case involving alienage
jurisdiction would be an action between a citizen of the United States
and a citizen of Great Britain.6 Although alienage jurisdiction is the
basis for only a small percentage of the cases brought to federal court,
7
its importance has been recognized by legislators and commentators
alike.'
3. See U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1997). The district courts have
original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States. See id.
4. Many commentators and practitioners fail to distinguish alienage jurisdiction
as a separate concept from diversity jurisdiction. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102 app. 01 (3rd. ed. 1997) [hereinafter MOORE].
5. See U.S. CONST. art. mII, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to ...
controversies... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1997) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions... between ... citizens of a State and citizens or subjects
of a foreign state."). Although alienage jurisdiction also refers to the jurisdiction of the
courts to hear disputes between United States citizens and foreign States, this Comment
does not deal with that aspect of the law.
6. Either party may bring the cause of action for alienage jurisdiction to exist.
7. In the fiscal year ending in March 30, 1994, 6.5% of diversity cases included a
foreign citizen or subject as a party. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction?
Historic Foundations and Modem Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes
Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 n.19 (1996).
8. See id. at 5. Many supporters of limiting or eliminating diversity jurisdiction
make an exception for alienage jurisdiction. See id.; see also THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DivisION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
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As the number of foreign parties entering U.S. courts grows, the
courts could easily get bogged down if they lack clear rules specifying
which parties can enter the federal courts under alienage jurisdiction.
Despite the apparently plain language of the Constitution and United
States Code section 1332(a)(2), courts continue to question who can sue
or be sued in federal court under alienage jurisdiction. A recent decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reveals that there is still
dispute as to the scope of alienage jurisdiction. In Matimak Trading Co.
v. Khalily,9 the Second Circuit held that a Hong Kong corporation could
not bring suit against an American defendant in federal court under
alienage jurisdiction."0 The majority of the court opined that a Hong
Kong corporation was not a foreign citizen or subject within the
meaning of the Constitution and section 1332(a)(2) because the
Executive branch of the United States government had not recognized
Hong Kong as an independent and sovereign entity by the time the
action was iniiated." The majority based its holding on cases which
have used a strict constructionist view that alienage jurisdiction exists
only over citizens or subjects of foreign states which have been
recognized by the United States as sovereign entities. 2
A "stateless" individual is someone with no official residence or
citizenship and no allegiance to any particular nation. 3 Stateless parties
cannot sue or be sued in the federal courts under alienage jurisdiction
because they are unable to clearly demonstrate that diversity exists.
4
According to Matimak, corporations that are citizens or subjects of
foreign states that have not been recognized by the United States are
COuRiTS 108 (1969) (proposing many restrictions on diversity jurisdiction, but making an
exception for jurisdiction over actions involving foreign parties because they need to be
assured access to the best procedures the federal government can supply and the dignity
and prestige of the United States).
9. 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997).
10. See id. at 78.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 79-82.
13. See Christine Biancheria, Restoring the Right To Have Rights: Statelessness
and Alienage Jurisdiction In Light ofAbu-Zeineh v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 11 AM.
U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 195, 196 n. 3 (1996). Statelessness has also been defined as "not
having a nationality under the law of any state." Ellen H. Greiper, Stateless Persons and
Their Lack of Access to Judicial Forums, 11 BROOK J. INT'L. L. 439, n.1 (1985) (citing
P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (1979)).
14. See Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799) (holding the
plaintiff must allege in his complaint that the defendant is a citizen of one State and the
plaintiff is a citizen of some other State).
"stateless."' 5 Under the laws of the United States, corporations can have
dual citizenship.' 6 A foreign corporation is a citizen of both the country
under whose laws it was incorporated and the country where it has its
principle place of business.'7 Thus, a corporation is stateless if it was
incorporated in an unrecognized foreign state and its principle place of
business is not in a recognized foreign state.'" Hong Kong was Matimak
Trading Company's principal place of business and state of
incorporation.'9 The Second Circuit held that because Matimak Trading
Company was a citizen of Hong Kong, which had not been recognized
by the United States as an independent and sovereign state, it was a
"stateless corporation."' 2  The court concluded that Matimak Trading
Company could not bring suit in the federal district court because federal
courts lack alienage jurisdiction over stateless corporations.2'
The Matimak decision is significant because it may affect whether
many offshore corporations can enter the federal courts under alienage
jurisdiction. When Matimak Trading Company initiated its action, Hong
Kong was a British Crown Colony.22 Hong Kong's status has changed
since then, although Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the
Cayman Islands are still British Crown Colonies.23 These colonies are
home to a great number of offshore corporations that conduct a
substantial amount of trade with the United States.24 The Matimak
decision raises the question whether these corporations have access to
the federal courts under alienage jurisdiction. The decision could have a
serious chilling effect on the amount of business these corporations
conduct with parties from the United States in the future.
American courts have been asking whether alienage jurisdiction
should encompass stateless corporations for less than fifty years. 2 Prior
15. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1997).
17. See id.
18. The term "stateless corporation" has been used by at least one commentator to
refer to "firms with over three billion dollars in annual sales with at least forty percent of
those sales outside their home nation." Roy D. Voorhees et al., Global Logistics and
Stateless Corporations, 59 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 144, 146 (1992). However, the vast
majority of commentators and practitioners use the term "stateless corporation" in the
same manner as this Comment.
19. See Matimak, 118 F.3dat78.
20. Id at 78.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 80 n. 1 (Altimari dissenting). The other British Crown Colonies are
St. Helena, the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. See id. This Comment focuses on the
colonies mentioned in the text because the United States conducts a great deal of trade
with them, but the Matitak decision will likely affect all of the Crown Colonies.
24. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
25. See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954). This was the
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to the first World War, the concept of statelessness had never been
discussed by American courts.' The Framers of the Constitution don't
appear to have anticipated that someone could be stateless.27 Congress
granted the federal district courts alienage jurisdiction, but in doing so it
used terminology similar to that used in the Constitution without
explaining how the courts should treat stateless corporations.2 Due to
this lack of direction, the courts have had difficulty deciding how to
interpret the grant of alienage jurisdiction.29 Some courts have simply
recognized that jurisdiction exists without analyzing whether the foreign
state is recognized by the United States as a free and independent
sovereign.'0 Other courts have required formal recognition of the foreign
state by the executive branch of the United States before granting
alienage jurisdiction." Still other courts have taken a middle ground by
looking for de facto recognition based on non-formal relations with the
United States or policy considerations.32
The purpose of this Comment is to determine whether alienage
jurisdiction should be extended to cover stateless corporations. In Part
II, the Comment seeks to determine why alienage jurisdiction was
written into the Constitution. The Comment explores the background
surrounding the Constitutional Convention, the comments of the
Framers which reveal their intentions, and the terminology finally used
in the Constitution. Part III delineates the evolution of the statutory
grant of alienage jurisdiction. Although there have not been many
alterations to the relevant statutes, the changes reveal whether Congress
intended to include stateless individuals and corporations within the
first time a court had to determine if a corporation was stateless. See id.
26. See Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306, 309-10 (2d
Cir. 1939) ('True the problem of statelessness has only become acute of late years, but it
promises to become increasingly more difficult as time goes on."). The first people
recognized as stateless appear to have been the refugees of World War I who were
displaced from their war-tom nations. See id.
27. See Biancheria, supra note 13, at 206 (commenting that the Framers of the
Constitution and the Drafters of the statutory grant of alienage jurisdiction thought that
they had included all non-Americans).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1997).
29. See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
30. See Timco Eng'g Inc. v. Rex & Co., 603 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1983).
31. See Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1940); National
Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988).
32. See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954); Bank of Haw. v.
Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744 (D. Haw. 1988).
grant of jurisdiction. In Part IV, the Comment will look at how the
courts have distinguished between foreign states to determine whether
their citizens or subjects should be granted alienage jurisdiction.
Part V addresses the decision of the Second Circuit in Matimak, and
its potential effects on future jurisprudence. Part V will analyze the
Matimak decision in light of the Constitutional, statutory, and judicial
history of alienage jurisdiction. In Part VI, the Comment concludes that
alienage jurisdiction should be given to all foreign corporations
regardless of whether their place of incorporation has been recognized
by the United States. In particular, the Supreme Court should take the
next available opportunity to reverse the decision of the Second Circuit
in Matimak.33 Alternatively, Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. section
1332(a)(2) to prevent further misinterpretations by the Second Circuit
and other courts.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF ALIENAGE JURISDICTION
Article Three, Section Two of the United States Constitution gives the
federal judiciary jurisdiction to hear all controversies between citizens of
the United States and foreign citizens or subjects.34 In order to
completely understand this grant of subject matter jurisdiction, we must
examine the historical bases and justifications behind its creation.
Unfortunately, the Framers of the Constitution did not explain with great
detail why they felt it was important to grant federal courts alienage
jurisdiction.36 Therefore, in order to gain insight into why the Framers
granted the federal courts alienage jurisdiction, it is important to first
look at the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the
Constitutional Convention.'
The former colonies had been unified in their struggle to gain
independence from Great Britain; however, when the war ended the
states refused to submit to a strong federal government." The Articles of
Confederation failed to form a cohesive federal government that could
govern the individual states in a manner beneficial to their combined
interests. 9  The absence of federal control angered many British
creditors who found themselves unable to enforce their claims in the
33. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997).
34. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
35. See 15 MOORE, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 01.
36. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 3.
37. Once we have determined the state of mind of the Framers, their few
comments concerning alienage jurisdiction will be clearer.
38. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 6-10.
39. See id.
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state courts."
Neither the British nor the American colonists complied with the
provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1783. The British had neither paid
for nor returned many of the slaves who joined the British during the
war,42 and continued to maintain nine frontier forts within United States'
territory.43  Meanwhile, the Americans also failed to comply with the
provisions of the Treaty.44 Section four of the Treaty assured British
creditors that no lawful impediments would be placed on their recovery
of private debts in the former colonies.45 The commerce-oriented British
considered this provision essential because many American farmers and
businessmen had debts which had not been collected during the war.
46
However, despite section four, the British found themselves still unable
to enforce their claims against Americans, who refused to acknowledge
their obligations.'7 British creditors were furious when the state
legislatures refused to repeal laws that kept these creditors from claiming
their debts.4 New York, Virginia, and other states continued to pass
new laws which were contrary to the terms of the Treaty.49 The state
courts were also hostile to British creditors."0 Almost half of the state
40. See id; see also Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA.
CrrY U. L. REv. 547, 553-62 (1989).
41. See Holt, supra note 40, at 553.
42. See id. (commenting that it was common knowledge that a British commander
refused to abide by the treaty because the British had encouraged the slaves to escape
during the war, and he did not feel it would be right to return them to slavery).
43. See id. The forts were a constant reminder to the American states of the very
real dangers of being dismembered or conquered. See id. at 553-54.
44. See id. at 554. The former colonists were still bitter after the seven and a half
years of war, and lashed out at returning Loyalists, despite the terms of the Treaty which
guaranteed a safe return so that they could get their estates in order. See id.
45. See id. at 554-55; see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 8.
46. See Holt, supra note 40, at 555. When the war began in 1775, American
courts closed, and both British and American laws cut off all private commerce between
the two opponents during the war, resulting in many debts not being paid. See id.
47. See id. The debtors had many reasons for not paying the British. Some were
simply dishonest, and hoped to use their distance from Britain and the confusion after the
war to avoid their debts. But many others believed that victory in the war for
independence had extinguished all American debts to the British. Finally, among the
Americans who acknowledged the validity of their debts and wished to pay, many lacked
the wherewithal to do so. See id. at 557-59. To complicate matters further, during the
war, every state legislature passed laws that restricted the power of British creditors to
collect. See id. at 560.
48. See id. at 561.
49. See id. For instance, South Carolina enacted laws that postponed the payment
of principle and interest on British debts into the future. See id.
50. See id. Not only did the American courts and juries enforce the hostile
Alienage Jurisdiction[VOL. 36: 249, 1999]
courts went so far as to close their doors to the claims of British
creditors."
The Federalists and other commerce-oriented Americans were
disturbed by this situation. These American leaders feared if the British
had no way to protect their American investments, they would invest
their money elsewhere. Americans who relied on British capital to
conduct their businesses recognized the need to offer creditors some way
to protect investments in the United States.53  The federal government
created by the Articles of Confederation lacked the power to encourage
or force state courts to treat foreign litigants as equals. In their search
for a solution to this problem, many Americans considered granting
foreigners access to a federal judiciary."
In the spring of 1787, delegates met at the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia "in Order to form a more perfect Union" and to
"establish Justice."55  Although the Framers made few statements
concerning the need or scope of alienage jurisdiction, those comments
that were recorded support its formation and reflect the Framers'
intentions. Alexander Contee Hanson of the Maryland State
Convention explained that the general purpose in creating a federal
judiciary with jurisdiction over disputes involving foreigners was to
ensure the faithful execution of the national laws and to assure citizens,
states, and foreigners that their disputes would be heard by an impartial
judiciary.57 Hanson's statement reflects the Framers' desire to provide
foreigners with a forum free of the prejudices of the State courts.
One of the main reasons for providing foreigners access to the less
prejudicial federal courts was to avoid hostilities with other nations who
may be affronted if their citizens are not treated fairly in American
courts. 9 William Davie of North Carolina supported a federal judiciary
legislation, but they also refused to acknowledge British creditors' interest that had
accrued during the war even if there was no applicable statute. See id.
51. See id. at 561-62.
52. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 8.
53. See id.
54. See id; see also Holt, supra note 40, at 562.
55. U.S. CONST. preamble. By stating that one purpose of forming a new
government was to establish justice, the Framers revealed their belief that justice did not
exist under the Articles of Confederation.
56. See id.; see also infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
57. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 11 n.55.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 11-12. In a letter to Charles Tillinghast, Timothy Pickering wrote:
[T~here is a particular [and] very cogent reason for securing to foreigners
a trial... in a federal court. With respect to foreigners, all of the states form
but one nation. This nation is responsible for the conduct of all its members
towards foreign nations, their citizens [and] subjects; and therefore ought to
possess the power of doing justice to the latter. Without this power, a single
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because it would help the United States avoid conflicts with other
nations.60 Alexander Hamilton agreed that the federal judiciary ought to
have the authority to hear all cases "in which the State tribunals cannot
be supposed to be impartial and unbiased. ' ,61 In his famous Federalist
Papers, Hamilton urged the formation of a federal judiciary which
would provide an impartial forum to foreign parties.2 Hamilton
believed that alienage jurisdiction would help avoid hostilities with other
nations.3 James Wilson later expressed his approval of this basis for
alienage jurisdiction because it provided Congress the ability to answer
the accusations of foreign sovereigns who may question why their
subjects were injured by state courts.64
state, or one of its citizens, might embroil the whole union in a foreign war.
Id. at 12 n.57 (quoting 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTrruTION 204 (1983)).
60. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 12. Mr. Davie commented:
If our courts of justice did not decide in favor of foreign citizens and
subjects when they ought, it might involve the whole Union in a war.... Mhe
denial of justice is one of the just causes of war. If these controversies were
left to the decision of particular states, it would be in their power, at any time,
to involve the continent in war... It is certainly clear that where the peace of
the Union is affected, the general judiciary ought to decide.
Id. at 12.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott, ed., 1894).
62. See id. at 444. "State Judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from
year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of
the national laws." Id. at 444.
63. See id. at 435-36. Hamilton wrote:
[T]he peace of the whole, ought not to be left at the disposal of the part.
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign Powers for the conduct
of its members. And the responsibility for an injury, ought ever to be
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of
justice by the sentences of courts, is with reason classed among the just causes
of war, it will follow that the Federal Judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.... [I]t is at least
problematical, whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the
subject of controversy was wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if
unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which
violated the stipulations of a treaty, or the general law of nations.... So great a
proportion of the controversies in which foreigners are parties, involve national
questions, that it is by far the most safe, and most expedient, to refer all those
in which they are concerned to the national tribunals.
Id. at 435-36.
64. See Van Der Schelling v. U. S. News & World Report, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 756,
759 (E.D. Pa. 1963). James Wilson explained:
If the United States are answerable for the injury [to foreigners], ought
they not to possess the means of compelling that faulty state to repair it? They
ought; and this is what is done here. For now, if complaint is made in
The other major reason expressed by the Framers for providing
foreigners with a neutral forum was to encourage foreign businessmen to
engage in commerce with the United States.6 James Wilson of
Pennsylvania, a leader in the drafting of Article I, supported diversity
and alienage jurisdiction because he felt that these bases of jurisdiction
in the federal courts were needed to restore to American merchants and
businessmen the foreign credit that was lost during the war.' James
Madison was also concerned with the effects state court prejudices were
having on the commercial affairs of the United States.67 Speaking at the
Convention, Madison said: "We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot
get justice done them in [the state] courts, and this has prevented many
wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us."
However, not all of the Framers supported the formation of a national
judiciary.69  The anti-federalists were concerned that British creditors
would gain an advantage over American debtors if they were allowed to
bring suit in federal courts, because traveling to distant federal courts
would impose an additional economic burden on the debtor who desired
to defend himself.0 Patrick Henry of Virginia vehemently protested the
alienage jurisdiction of federal courts.7' He felt the state courts could be
trusted to be impartial when foreigners came before them with claims
against American citizens.72 However, the fact that the State courts had
mistreated British creditors under the Articles of Confederation was
consequence of such injustice, Congress can answer, "Why did not your
subject apply to the General Courts, where the unequal and partial laws of a
particular state would have had no force?"
Id. at 759.
65. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 13; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTrrUION 634-35 (1833). In his commentary, Justice Story remarked:
[I]t is of great national importance to advance public, as well as private
credit, in our intercourse with foreign nations and their subjects. Nothing can
be more beneficial in this respect, than to create an impartial tribunal, to which
they may have resort upon all occasions, when it may be necessary to
ascertain, or enforce their rights.
Id. at 634-35.
66. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 13. Wilson said, "[I]s it not necessary, if we
mean to restore either public or private credit, that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have
a just and impartial tribunal to which they may resort?... [T]hey ought to have the same
security against the state laws that... the citizens have.... ." Id. at 13.
67. See id. at 14.
68. Id. at 14.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 14.
72. See id. Henry asked: "Cannot we trust the state courts with disputes between a
Frenchman, or an Englishman, and a citizen; or with disputes between two Frenchmen?
This is disgraceful; it will annihilate your state judiciary: it will prostrate your
legislature." Id. at 14.
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proof that Henry was wrong to suppose that the courts could be trusted.73
Of the five plans presented at the Convention, four included
provisions for jurisdiction over suits involving aliens.74  The Virginia
Plan, submitted by Edmund Randolph, provided for federal jurisdiction
in "cases in which foreigners or citizens of other states applying to such
jurisdictions may be interested."75 After minor alterations, the Virginia
plan was unanimously adopted by the delegates to the Convention.76
The final draft of the Constitution states that "the Judicial Power shall
extend.., to Controversies... between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." The legislative history does
not reveal why the Framers settled upon this phrase. However,
commentators have speculated that the Framers sought to include all
cases involving parties of diverse citizenshi? as long as at least one of
the parties was a citizen of the United States. The Framers thought that
this phrase would include any action between a United States citizen and
a foreigner. 9
The Framers apparently did not foresee a situation where a party could
be neither a citizen nor subject of a foreign State."° The Framers formed
a federal judiciary with alienage jurisdiction in order to protect foreign
parties from both actual and feared local prejudice and influence in the
state courts.8' By affording foreigners a neutral forum, the Framers
73. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
74. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789,
and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L. J. 1421, 1460 (1990); Johnson,
supra note 7, at 10; Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 (1928); 15 MOORE, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 01.
75. Johnson, supra note 7, at 10. The New Jersey Plan stated that the courts would
possess "authority to hear and determine.., in all cases in which foreigners may be
interested." Holt, supra note 74, at 1460 n.136. Hamilton's Plan gave the courts
"jurisdiction... in all causes in which.., the citizens of foreign nations are concerned."
Id. Under Mason's plan, "jurisdiction... shall extend... to controversies... between a
State and the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects." Id.
76. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 10.
77. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
78. See Biancheria, supra note 13, at 210.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 206.
81. See 15 MOORE, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 03. Also see Justice Curtis's
dissenting opinion in Dred Scott, in which he stated:
Its purpose was, to extend the judicial power to those controversies into
which local feelings or interests might so enter as to disturb the course of
justice, or give rise to suspicions that they had done so, and thus possibly give
occasion to jealousy or ill will between different States, or a particular State
and a foreign nation.
hoped both to avoid conflicts with foreign sovereigns and to encourage
foreign businesses to trade with the United States.2 Including stateless
entities would not implicate the first purpose of alienage jurisdiction,
avoiding conflicts with foreign sovereigns, because no foreign sovereign
would be affronted by the mistreatment of these parties. However, the
second purpose which alienage jurisdiction was designed to accomplish,
namely to foster foreign commerce, warrants jurisdiction over stateless
parties. Many stateless parties will be less inclined to engage in business
with citizens of the United States if they are not given equal access to a
neutral forum where they may seek enforcement of their legal rights and
claims. Therefore, giving the federal courts the power to hear disputes
between Americans and stateless parties would accomplish the
objectives of the Framers.
III. THE STATUTORY GRANT OF ALIENAGE JURISDICTION
Although the Constitution was written to give the district courts
expansive jurisdiction over parties of diverse citizenship, Congress is not
obligated to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the full extent
granted by the Constitution." The statutory evolution of alienage
jurisdiction is important because it conveys to what extent Congress has
interpreted the language of the Constitution and reveals what Congress
intended to encompass with the current statutory language. Of particular
importance is the Judiciary Act of 1789," enacted by the First Congress,
because many of the legislators who drafted this Act had previously
been Framers of the Constitution." The drafters of the Judiciary Act had
particular insight into what the Framers of the Constitution intended to
encompass with the words "controversies between... citizens ... and
foreign states, citizens or subjects."86
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, reputed to have been the guiding
genius behind the Judiciary Act of 1789,Y indicated in a letter to Judge
Richard Law that he wished to give the circuit courts original
jurisdiction over "all cases involving foreigners and citizens of different
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 580 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
82. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish." Id.
84. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79.
85. See Biancheria, supra note 13, at 210.
86. Id.at210-11.
87. See Friendly, supra note 74, at 500. Friendly mentions that Ellsworth's earlier
experience on the committee appointed by the Congress of the Confederation to hear
appeals in prize cases prepared him to be an advocate of a strong judiciary. See id.
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states."88 Instead of using the words "foreign citizens or subjects," the
Judiciary Act gave federal circuit courts original jurisdiction over "all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in
dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred
dollars, and... an alien is a party."' 9
The First Congress's use of the term "alien" as a substitute for
"foreign citizens or subjects" indicates their belief that the Framers
intended to include all non-Americans within alienage jurisdiction.9
This proposition is supported by the thoughts of Chief Justice Story,
who wrote in 1833: "The inquiry may here be made, who are to be
deemed aliens entitled to sue in the courts of the United States. The
general answer is, any person, who is not a citizen of the United
States."9'
Although 'the drafters of the Judiciary Act did not give the courts
general diversity jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the
Constitution," the First Congress actually exceeded the Constitutional
limits by granting jurisdiction in all actions where "an alien is a party.
93
Thus, under the Judiciary Act, a foreigner could bring suit against
another foreigner in United States district courts.94 In Mossman v.
88. Id. at 500 (citing WHARTON, STATE TR4LS 38 (1849)).
89. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73,78-79 (emphasis added).
90. The drafters of the Judiciary Act used "aliens," "foreigners," and "foreign
citizens or subjects" as interchangeably as the Framers. See Friendly, supra note 74, at
501-02. The draft bill used the term "foreigner," but this was eventually changed to
"alien." See id.
91. STORY, supra note 65, at 635. Justice Story added:
A foreign corporation, established in a foreign country, all of whose
members are aliens, is entitled to sue in the same manner, that an alien may
personally sue in the courts of the Union... In relation to aliens, however, it
should be stated, that they have a right to sue only, while peace exists between
their country and our own. For if a war breaks out, and they thereby become
alien enemies, their right to sue will be suspended until peace is resumed.
Id. at 636.
92. See 15 MOORE, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 04(1). The Constitution permits the
federal courts to hear all controversies "between Citizens of Different States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 limited diversity jurisdiction to
suits where the "dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs .... five hundred dollars" and where
the "suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of
another State." 15 MOORE, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 04(1) n.7.
93. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73,78-79.
94. See id. This is contrary to the constitutional grant of jurisdiction, which
required that at least one party be a citizen of the United States. See U.S. CONsT. art. III,
§ 2.
Higginson,95 the Supreme Court noted this defect in the Judiciary Act.
Instead of declaring the Act unconstitutional, the Court simply read into
the language of the statute the Constitutional requirement that one of the
parties had to be an American citizen.9 The Court did not comment on
the Act's use of "alien" instead of "foreign citizen or subject," as used in
the Constitution. 7 This failure to comment at a time when one would
expect the Court to criticize every deficiency in the Act is evidence that
the Court believed these phrases were synonymous and encompassed all
non-Americans. 9 Indeed, the First Congress and the Supreme Court
used the broad term "alien" interchangeably with "foreign citizens or
subjects," just as the Framers of the Constitution had done earlier.
The requirement for diversity jurisdiction that the matter in dispute
exceed five hundred dollars exclusive of costs was a compromise with
Anti-federalists who did not want to give federal courts broad diversity
jurisdiction in the Constitution." The Anti-federalists insisted that this
restriction be placed in the Judiciary Act, hoping to prevent British
creditors from using the federal courts to the disadvantage of poor
American debtors."° Imposing this requirement excluded a very large
number of the British claims from federal court under alienage
jurisdiction. 1
In 1875, Congress amended the Judiciary Act to repair the defect
made clear by the Supreme Court.'° The new version of the Act, written
to conform with the language of the Constitution, 3 gave the circuit
95. See 4 U.S. (4 DaI.) 12, 14 (1800). The Court stated "but as the legislative
power of conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, is, in this respect, confined to suits
between citizens and foreigners, we must so expound the terms of the law, as to meet the
case, 'where, indeed, an alien is one party,' but a citizen is the other." It at 14; see also
Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. 303, 304 (1809) ("mhe statute cannot extend the
jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution.").
96. See Mossman, 4 U.S. at 14.
97. See id.
98. Id. In Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 F. Cas. 1278 (1851), the Court noted:
Construing [the Judiciary Act of 1789], however, in connection with the
provision of the constitution, there can be no difficulty as to the meaning
intended by congress. The controversy, in order to give jurisdiction, must be
between a state, or a citizen thereof, and a foreign state, or a citizen or subject
thereof; that is, speaking with reference to individual parties, the suit must be
one in which a citizen of a state and an alien are parties.
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
99. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 18-19.
100. See id.; see also WLAM R. CAsTO, THE SuPREM COURT IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC 53 (1995) ("Although the amount in controversy limitation was driven in part
by a desire to bar British creditors from the federal courts, the limitation also was
inserted to protect small debtors from being forced to travel long distances to defend
minor claims.").
101. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 19.
102. 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
103. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 21.
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courts original jurisdiction over controversies between "citizens of a
State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects."' '  The only change
Congress intended regarding alienage jurisdiction was preventing aliens
from suing other aliens in federal court.0 5 Congress did not mention any
desire to limit alienage jurisdiction to certain foreigners." By using the
same language in the Act as the Framers used in the Constitution,
Congress apparently intended the alienage jurisdiction of the circuit
courts to reach as broadly as is constitutionally permissible, provided the
action exceeded five hundred dollars exclusive of costs.'o
Subsequent amendments to the statute have largely been directed to
diversity jurisdiction as a whole, and have affected alienage jurisdiction
only by association. 3 The most significant changes have been steady
increases to the amount in controversy required to bring an action into
federal court under diversity jurisdiction.'09 In 1887, Congress increased
the minimum amount in controversy from five hundred to two thousand
dollars. ' The Judicial Code of 1911 further increased the necessary
amount in controversy to three thousand dollars, and also transferred the
duty to hear trials from the circuit courts to the district courts.1
The Judicial Code of 1948 "lumped" general diversity and alienage
jurisdiction together under the title "Diversity Jurisdiction."' 2 In 1958,
Congress again increased the amount in controversy, this time to ten
104. 18 Stat. 470.
105. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 21; Biancheria; supra note 13, at 211.
106. See Biancheria, supra note 13, at 212 n.80.
107. See MOORE, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 04(3). Congress also expanded
general diversity jurisdiction to the constitutional limits, subject only to the amount in
controversy requirement. See id.
108. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 21. This may be because Congress and many
commentators have failed to distinguish alienage jurisdiction from diversity jurisdiction,
and the different purposes they serve.
109. See id. Congress' goal in increasing the amount in controversy has been to
limit the number of diversity cases in the federal courts. See id.
110. See MOORE, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 04(3) & n.37 (citing 24 Stat. 552
(1887), amended by 25 Stat. 433 (1888)).
111. See id. at § 102 app. 04(3) (citing § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911)).
112. Id. at § 102 app. 04(4). Section 1332 of the Code provided:
a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between:
1) Citizens of different States;
2) Citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
3) Citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof are additional parties.
Id.
thousand dollars, and added section 1332(c)(1)."' In this new section,
Congress recognized that a corporation may be treated as a citizen both
in the state where it has its principal place of business and where it is
incorporated."4  In 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.15
amended section 1332(2) and (3) to delete reference to foreign states,
and added subparagraph (4) and sections 1330 and 1603(a) to deal with
jurisdiction over actions involving foreign states."6  Section 1603(a)
defined "foreign state," as used throughout Title 28 except in section
1608, to include political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of
foreign states."
7
In 1988, Congress raised the amount in controversy, limiting
jurisdiction to actions with claims in excess of fifty thousand dollars
exclusive of costs."' Congress justified the increase by the potential
reduction in the federal caseload and to reflect inflation since the last
increase in 1958." 9 In the most recentchange to diversity jurisdiction,
and with it alienage jurisdiction, Congress again increased the amount in
controversy to its present level of seventy-five thousand dollars
113. Seeid. at§ 102app. 04(5).
114. See id. For an excellent discussion about the confusion surrounding section
1332(c) and its application to alien corporations, see George M. Esahak, Comment,
Diversity Jurisdiction: The Dilemma of Dual Citizenship and Alien Corporations, 77
NW. U. L. REV. 565 (1982). In his Comment, Mr. Esahak summarizes corporate
citizenship prior to section 1332(c):
Historically, dual citizenship for corporate entities has not been the rule.
In the first case to construe the jurisdictional question of a corporation's
citizenship, the Supreme Court stated that only natural persons could be
deemed "citizens" for diversity purposes. Consequently, for years diversity
jurisdiction depended on the citizenship of a corporation's shareholders, and
not on the location of the business enterprise or its state of incorporation. In
Louisville C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, however, the Court began to retreat from
Deveaux. The Court in Letson held that a corporation may be considered a
"person" and thus a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated. Thus,
corporate citizenship could be found in the state of incorporation as well as in
each state in which the corporation's shareholders were citizens. Later, in
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., the Court confined the situs of corporate
citizenship solely to the state of incorporation by holding that a corporation's
shareholders conclusively are presumed to be citizens of the state in which the
business is incorporated.
Id. at n.3 (citations omitted).
115. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, P.L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891.
116. See Mooa, supra note 4, at § 102 app. 04(6). One of the main objectives of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was to codify the principle of sovereign
immunity, such that it is restricted to suits involving a foreign state's public acts and
does not afford a foreign state immunity from suits based on its commercial or private
acts. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 2 (1976).
117. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a) (Supp. 1997).
118. See 102 Stat. 4646 (1988).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 45 (1988). By increasing the amount in
controversy to fifty thousand dollars, Congress expected to reduce the diversity caseload
by up to forty percent. Id.
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exclusive of interest and costs."
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress gave the circuit courts
jurisdiction to hear all cases involving aliens.' 2 ' The legislature's use of
the broad term "aliens" reveals that they believed the Constitutional
grant of alienage jurisdiction covers actions between citizens of the
United States and parties that are not citizens of the United States. Since
1875, Congress has authorized federal courts to exercise alienage
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, limiting
these actions only by their amount in controversy. The current version
of section 1332(a)(2) gives district courts original jurisdiction over all
civil actions "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between... citizens of
a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."'
IV. JUDICIAL EXERCISE OF ALIENAGE JURISDICTION
American courts have consistently held that in order for federal courts
to exercise alienage jurisdiction over a foreign party, that party must
allege that it is a citizen or subject of a foreign state. In Wilson v. City
Bank, the plaintiffs' bill alleged that they were "of London, in England,
and aliens to each and all of the United States," and that the defendant
was of New York." Circuit Justice Story sustained defendant's
demurrer because, although the bill alleged that the plaintiffs were
aliens, it did not allege that they were citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.'2 Because the foreign party must allege citizenship in some
country, stateless individuals have been unable to enter the federal courts
through alienage jurisdiction.
In Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, Judge Clark stated that even when a
party alleges that it is a citizen or subject of a foreign state, the federal
courts do not have alienage jurisdiction over the subject matter if the
foreign state has not been recognized by the United States government.' 2
The executive branch of the United States government must recognize
foreign states before the state, its citizens and subjects, and its
120. See Act of Oct. 19, 1996, P.L. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3850.
121. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (1789).
122. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
123. 30 F. Cas. 116, 116 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838).
124. See id.
125. 109 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1940).
corporations may enter the federal courts under alienage jurisdiction. 26
Despite the fact that the constitutional and statutory grants of alienage
jurisdiction have never included recognition by the United States as a
prerequisite to the exercise of alienage jurisdiction, courts have enforced
the rule established in Land Oberoesterreich"Z
In Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, the court inspected the
constitutional and statutory history of alienage jurisdiction to determine
whether it should apply to stateless individuals.'2 The court used
Alexander Hamilton's writings in The Federalist Papers to come to the
conclusion that the primary purpose of alienage jurisdiction was to avoid
entanglements with other sovereigns which might ensue from failure to
treat the legal controversies of aliens of a national level.'29 Because the
mistreatment of stateless individuals in state courts does not implicate
the foreign relations of the United States with respect to other sovereign
nations, the court felt that the Framers intended to refer only to those
aliens who were citizens or subjects of recognized foreign states. 3
Accordingly, the Blair Holdings court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the stateless defendant.'
According to the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, characteristics of a foreign state include a defined
territory, a permanent population, and an autonomous government that
has the capacity to engage in formal relations with other sovereign
states. 32 It is the obligation of the executive branch of the United States
126. See id.
127. See e.g. Shoemaker v. Malaxia, 241 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding a
stateless alien is not a citizen or subject of a foreign state within the meaning of
§1332(a)(2)); Factor v. Pennington Press, 238 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. 111. 1964) (holding a
stateless person is not a citizen of a state of the United States, nor of any foreign state for
purposes of diversity).
128. 133 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The defendant had forfeited his Soviet
citizenship, and the Portuguese government had canceled his Portuguese citizenship. See
id. at 499. Accordingly, defendant had registered with the United States Department of
Justice as a stateless person, and held a "Nansen" passport, issued to him by the League
of Nations in recognition of his status as a stateless person. See id.
129. See id. at 500. The court also noted the Framers' concern for the states' failure
to give protection to foreigners in accordance with treaties. See id. However, the court
never mentioned the intent of the Framers to encourage foreign trade by offering a
neutral forum. See id. at 496.
130. See id. at 500. The court additionally found that it was implicit in the holding
of Wilson v. City Bank, 30 F.Cas. 116 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838), that the word "aliens" as
used in the Judiciary Act of 1789 was not intended as a synonym for "non-citizens of the
United States." Id.
131. See id. at 501. The court noted that the plaintiff is not denied justice because it
may still sue in the state courts. See id.
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987).
266
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government, not the judiciary, to recognize foreign states.' When
foreign parties enter the federal courts on the basis of diversity, the
courts have a duty to determine whether the United States has
recognized the foreign entity as a state for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction. In the vast majority of cases, the court will have little
trouble deciding that the foreign state has been recognized by the United
States.'3 However, the twentieth century has witnessed many changes to
the make-up of the world order, and American courts have had difficulty
deciding whether some international entities have been recognized by
the United States.
A. Alienage Jurisdiction Over the Citizens of Emerging Foreign States
In the latter half of the twentieth century, many old empires have
crumbled or been divided, resulting in an influx of new international
entities. Initially, American courts limited alienage jurisdiction to
nationals of foreign entities that had been officially recognized by the
executive branch of the United States government as a sovereign state.'35
Because recognition of sovereignty is a political matter under the
authority of the executive branch,'36 the courts felt bound to dismiss
actions involving nationals of the new countries for lack of jurisdiction
until the emerging state had been officially recognized by the executive
branch of the United States government.' Eventually, courts realized
133. See Klausner v. Levy, 83 F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Va. 1949).
134. Parties from well recognized countries, such as Spain, Mexico or Italy, are
clearly foreign citizens or subjects for purposes of § 1332(a)(2).
135. See Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1940).
136. The President's authority to recognize foreign states and to maintain
diplomatic relations is implied from his constitutional power to appoint and receive
ambassadors. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
137. See Klausner, 83 F. Supp. at 600. In Klausner, an American defendant
challenged the jurisdiction of the court over an action brought by a Palestinian plaintiff
under § 1332(a)(2). See id. at 599. Palestine had been established under the Treaty of
Versailles in 1923 as a mandate of Great Britain. See id. at 600. As a mandate, the
territory of Palestine lacked local autonomy and its inhabitants were not considered
citizens of Great Britain. See id. The United States did not formally recognize Israel,
which encompassed the territory of the plaintiff's citizenship, until several months after
the action had commenced. See id. The court decided that without formal recognition
by the executive branch of the government, the court could not treat Israel as a sovereign
state. See id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the action for a lack of jurisdiction,
because the plaintiff was not a citizen or subject of a foreign state within the meaning of
the Constitution or Section 1332(a)(2). See id.
that requiring official recognition was not an appropriate standard.'38 It
was clear that the citizens of emerging nations needed access to the
federal judiciary if they were going to conduct business and have normal
relations with citizens of the United States.
1. The Introduction of De Facto Recognition
In Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., the Court held that "[u]nless form
rather than substance is to govern," foreign parties should not be
restricted from the federal courts because their country of origin had not
yet been formally recognized by the executive branch of the United
States government.'39 Murarka arose out of an action initiated by an
Indian corporation for breach of contract."' The Indian corporation filed
its complaint on July 14, 1947,'"' a little more than a month before the
United States formally recognized India as a sovereign and independent
nation. 142 The court noted that under the standard previously used by
American courts, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
India was not formally recognized by the United States as a sovereign
state at the commencement of the suit.143  Instead of looking at
formalities, the court relied on the relationship between the United States
and India prior to the formal recognition to come to the conclusion that
the United States had de facto recognized India.'" By finding de facto
recognition when formal recognition did not exist, the Murarka court
established a new standard for foreign parties to meet in order to enter
the federal courts,'45 a standard which is sensitive to the intention of the
Framers to open the federal courts to all foreigners that are able to allege
138. See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
139. Id. at 552.
140. See id. at 549.
141. See id. at 552.
142. See id. at 551. India had been part of the British empire, but following the end
of World War II, the British government had been trying to prepare India for
independence. See id. The State Department informed the Court that the United States
formally recognized India's independence from Great Britain on August 15, 1947. See
id. at 551-52.
143. See id. at 552.
144. See id. The court found that the United States had taken steps to recognize the
interim government of India by exchanging ambassadors in February and April of 1947.
See id. For all intents and purposes, these acts constituted recognition of the Interim
Government of India at a time when India's official independence was imminent. See id.
145. See id. A narrow view of the Murarka decision would restrict de facto
recognition to circumstances where the emerging nation is on the verge of gaining
independence and sovereignty, because this was the situation the court was faced with.
See id. However, the court did not explicitly limit its decision in such a manner, and this
Comment argues that de facto recognition is not limited to foreign countries with
imminent formal recognition. See id.
268
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foreign citizenship.' 46
2. The Relinquishment of United States Sovereignty
In 1947, the United States and the United Nations Security Council
formed the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands." Under this
agreement, the United States was entrusted with the administrative,
legislative, and judicial authority over the Trust Territories.14 Although
the territories were to operate as if fully sovereign, technical sovereignty
rested with the United States.' 49 The relationship allowed the United
States to receive preferential treatment in economic and commercial
matters, and to declare all or any part of the territory a closed area (such
that even the United Nations would be unable to enter) in order for the
United States to exercise its trustee functions."'
Under this agreement, sovereignty clearly did not rest with any of the
territories. At first, the courts did not permit alienage jurisdiction over
citizens of the Trust Territory.' But as the individual territories began
to gain more independence, the courts began to permit alienage
jurisdiction over the citizens of the territories. 5 In doing this, one court
146. See discussion supra Part II.
147. See Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July
18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301; T.I.A.S. No. 1665. The Territory included Palau, the Northern
Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia (made up
of the districts of Truk, Ponape, Kosrae and Yap). See Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v.
Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1239 (2d Cir. 1991).
148. See Morgan Guar., 924 F.2d at 1239.
149. See People of Saipan v. United States Dept. of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 653
(D. Haw. 1973).
150. See id. at 654.
151. See World Communications Corp. v. Micronesian Telecomms Corp., 456 F.
Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1978). The defendant was incorporated under the laws of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. See id. at 1123. Before the court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, it noted that some of the considerations which underlie
the existence of diversity jurisdiction may have been present, however the court felt that
they did not justify an expansive judicial interpretation of § 1332(a)(2). See id. at 1125.
152. See Bank of Haw. v. Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744 (D. Haw. 1988). The Republic
of the Marshall Islands technically was still a member of the Trust Territories, but the
court found that the territory had de facto become a foreign state. See also Morgan
Guar. Trust Co, 924 F.2d at 1238-41. The lower court had given the Republic of Palau
de facto recognition on the basis of Palau's anticipated independence as negotiated in an
agreement with the United States. However, after the lower court's decision, the Palauan
people failed to give their final approval of the agreement, and Palau's status as a Trust
Territory of the United States was never changed. Accordingly, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the lower court because the United States continued to exercise
sovereignty over Palau. See id. The Northern Mariana Islands and the Federated States
listed the following indications of sovereignty:
the power to declare and wage war; to conclude peace; to maintain diplomatic
ties with other sovereigns, to acquire territory by discovery and occupation, to
make international agreements and treaties[;]... to exclude or expel
aliens[;] ... regulation of coinage systems, patents and copyriglW and postal
services[;] .. and the selection of a flag or other national symbol.
A court may look for these powers in a foreign state that has not been
formally recognized when it is determining whether the United States
has de facto recognized the foreign state.
B. Alienage Jurisdiction After the Severance of Formal Relations
Another issue which the courts have had to address on several
occasions is whether the recognition requirement prohibits foreigners
from entering federal courts under section 1332(a)(2) after the United
States has ended formal relations with the government of their country
of origin. '" This issue arose several times during the Cold War as the
United States government broke off official relations with countries that
adopted communist governments.'55 The courts decided that a change in
government does not affect whether the United States recognizes a
foreign nation as an independent and sovereign entity.'56 In Calderone v.
Naviera Vacuba S/A, the court held that if the executive branch felt that
nationals of a formerly recognized nation should no longer be given
access to the federal courts, it needed to advise the courts of this
decision.'
In Chang v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,' the Illinois court
expanded the de facto recognition standard established in Murarka.59
of Micronesia concluded agreements with the United States to terminate their status as
Trust Territories. See id. at 1239.
153. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (citations omitted).
154. See e.g. Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (Cuba); Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 325 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1963) (Cuba); Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (Taiwan); Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F.
Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Iran); National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The MIT Stolt
Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988) (Iran).
155. See Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 845; Calderone, 325 F.2d at 76; Chang, 506 F.
Supp. at 975.
156. See Sabbatino, 307 F. 2d at 855 (holding that American courts should not
"pass on the validity of the acts of foreign governments performed in their capacities as
sovereigns within their own territories."); Calderone, 325 F. 2d at 76.
157. See Calderone, 325 F. 2d at 77. The court in Calderone did not need to rely on
the status quo in this case because the executive branch had urged that nationalized
Cuban corporations be given access to America's federal courts. See id.
158. 506 F. Supp. 975.
159. See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954).
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The United States had ended formal relations with Taiwan on December
30, 1978 as part of its recognition of the People's Republic of China as
the sole government of China;'6° however the Chang court found that
Taiwanese parties were still foreign citizens or subjects for purposes of
section 1332(a)(2).'6' Chang, a Taiwanese national, had initiated her
medical malpractice action in federal court under alienage jurisdiction
twelve days before President Carter broke off official relations. 62 In
determining whether the court had proper jurisdiction over the matter,
the court looked to the historical bases of alienage jurisdiction and found
that Taiwan had de facto recognition by the United States'63
The Chang court rejected the requirement added in Klausner v. Levy'6 4
that the United States's formal recognition of the foreign state must be
imminent, because such requirement is not supported by the historical
bases for alienage jurisdiction."'6 Recognition of Taiwan by the United
States as an independent and sovereign foreign state was far from
imminent,'" but the court held that de facto recognition must be flexible
in order to meet the future needs of an increasingly international
community.1 67 The court concluded that the significant trade relations
160. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 976 (citing Presidential Memorandum of
December 30, 1978, 3195-01-M, 44 FEDERALREGIsTER 1075 (Jan. 4, 1979)).
161. See id. at 979.
162. See id. at 976.
163. See id. at 977 n.1. Judge Grady noted that Taiwan must be recognized as a
sovereign and independent entity for its nationals to be able to bring suit in federal court,
and acknowledged that the United States had not formally recognized Taiwan. See id. at
976-77.
164. See Klausner v. Levy, 83 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Va. 1949).
165. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 977 n.2.
166. See id. The imminence of formal recognition had been a major factor in the
Murarka court's finding that the United States had granted India de facto recognition.
See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954). The Chang decision
is a departure from the requirement of imminent recognition. By recognizing the
People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, the United States
recognized that Taiwan was not a sovereign nation, and would not become one in the
foreseeable future. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 976.
167. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 977 n.2. Judge Grady noted that:
certain policy concerns support a mere "recognition" standard for alienage
diversity jurisdiction. There must be flexibility in foreign affairs as we
approach the 21st century, so that the United States and the citizens may
maintain "commercial, cultural and other relations" with another nation and its
citizens even in the absence of official diplomatic relations.... Allowing only
foreign nationals of countries "formally recognized" by the United States to
sue in our courts would impair that flexibility.
Id. (citations omitted).
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and cultural or other contacts with Taiwan on a non-governmental level
were evidence of de facto recognition.'6 The federal courts could
exercise alienage jurisdiction over Taiwanese nationals despite the
retraction of formal recognition by the executive branch of the
government. 169
In Chang, the executive branch of the United States had broken off
official relations with the government of Taiwan because it no longer
recognized Taiwan to be an independent and sovereign nationY" This
situation needs to be distinguished from cases where the United States
concludes official relations with a foreign government, but continues to
recognize the foreign state as an independent and sovereign entity."'
Foreign parties fall under alienage jurisdiction regardless of the type of
government that exists in their country.17 2  Therefore, when the
government of a sovereign nation is replaced by a new government,
which the executive branch of the United States refuses to officially
recognize or conduct relations with, the federal courts may continue
exercising alienage jurisdiction over the citizens of that foreign state.
73
Because the courts must defer to the executive branch's recognition of
foreign states, decisions by the State Department that citizens of a non-
168. See id. at 978 n.3. De facto recognition cannot be based on contacts and
relations which "violate the letter or intent of any treaty, executive order, emergency
regulation, or other directive of the executive branch." Id.
169. See id. at 979. To avoid any possible confusion, the court sought the opinion
of the U.S. State Department, which agreed that Taiwanese citizens should be permitted
access to federal courts. See id. at 978.
170. See id. at 976.
171. See Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp.
1275, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf,
860 F.2d 551,552-53 (2d Cir. 1988).
172. See Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1277; National Petrochemical Co., 860
F.2d at 553; Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
173. Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1277; National Petrochemical Co., 860 F.2d
at 553. The courts continued to exercise alienage jurisdiction over Iranian corporations
after the United States refused to recognize Khomeini's revolutionary government. See
id. Judge Cannella explained the reasoning in Iran Handicraft:
Recognition of a new State must not be confused with recognition of a
new Head or Government of an old State. Recognition of a change in the
headship of a State, or in the form of its Government, or of a change in the title
of an old State, are matters of importance. But the granting or refusing of
these recognitions has nothing to do with recognition of the State itself. If a
foreign State refuses to recognize a new Head or a change in the form of the
Government of an Old State, the latter does not thereby lose its recognition as
an International Person, although no official intercourse is henceforth possible
between the two States as long as recognition is not given either expressly or
tacitly.
Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1277-78 (quoting OPPENHEIM'S INTRNATIONAL LAW §
73, at 129-30 (8th ed. 1955)).
174. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-20
272
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recognized foreign state should have access to federal courts are a key
factor in determining whether recognition exists.1 75  The State
Department may recommend giving foreign parties access to a federal
forum, and at the same time refuse to officially recognize the entity as a
foreign state. When there are no diplomatic relations, a statement by the
State Department that the foreign party's presence in federal court
should be permitted will typically remove any lingering obstacles to
jurisdiction.
176
C. Alienage Jurisdiction over the Citizens of Semi-Autonomous States
Although the courts have been able to establish clear standards for
exercising alienage jurisdiction over the previously mentioned categories
of foreign states,V the courts have had difficulty deciding how to treat
colonial territories. These entities have clearly not been recognized by
the United States as independent or sovereign foreign states, and yet they
often are at least semi-autonomous. Because foreign states must be
recognized by the United States for the federal courts to exercise
alienage jurisdiction, courts have had to carefully examine the extent of
the relationship between the United States and these special territories.
The courts will grant jurisdiction if they find that the United States has
granted the territory de facto recognition as a sovereign entity.' 78 The
courts will also grant parties from semi-autonomous states access to the
federal courts under alienage jurisdiction if the party can claim both
citizenship in the territory and status as a subject of a different foreign
state that has clearly been recognized by the United States.
(1936).
175. See Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 325 F.2d 76, 77 (2d. Cir 1963)
(recommending that Cuban corporation be given access); National Petrochemical Co.,
860 F.2d at 553 (submitting an amicus brief recommending that an Iranian corporation
be granted access); Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242, 1245
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (communicating that the United States considers Hong Kong to be a
colony of Great Britain).
176. See Transportes Aeros De Angola v. Ronair, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 858, 863-64
(D. Del. 1982) (permitting a corporation owned by the People's Republic of Angola to
sue in federal court under alienage jurisdiction despite a lack of diplomatic relations.)
177. See supra Part IV.A-B.
178. See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954); Chang v.
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. 1l. 1980).
179. This is because the Constitution and § 1332(a)(2) grant alienage jurisdiction
over subjects of foreign states. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)
(1994).
Corporations from the British Crown Colonies have given American
courts the most trouble when deciding whether alienage jurisdiction
exists. Hong Kong is no longer a Crown Colony because Great Britain
returned sovereignty to the People's Republic of China on July 1,
1997;"' but Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands,
Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands, and St. Helena are all still Crown
Colonies."' These Colonies, unlike the Trust Territories previously
protected by the United States, have not received independence from
Great Britain. Apparently uncertain about what standard should apply,
American courts have both given and denied jurisdiction without clearly
differentiating their reasons.
The Crown Colonies plainly lack independence or sovereignty. Each
Crown Colony is administered by a governor who is appointed by, and is
a representative of, the Queen of England.82 The Governors act with the
advice and consent of a local legislative counsel, however the Governor
has the final say in all matters.' 3 Individuals from the Crown Colonies
are treated as citizens or subjects within the meaning of section
1332(a)(2) because the United Kingdom considers natural persons with
citizenship in the colonies to also be subjects of the Crown."4 However,
the United Kingdom has not extended this status to those corporations
that are citizens of the colonies."
In Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics Ltd., the initial case
involving a corporation from one of the Crown Colonies, the Southern
District of New York dismissed the action because the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.'86 The court decided that the defendant Hong
Kong corporation could not be sued in federal court under alienage
jurisdiction because the United States had neither formally nor de facto
recognized Hong Kong.'u In determining whether de facto recognition
existed under the principles laid out in Murarka v. Bachrack Bros.,'m the
Windert court noted that the United States conducts no direct dealings
with Hong Kong because it is a colony of the United Kingdom,'89 and
under British law Hong Kong corporations are neither citizens nor
180. See H.K.S.A.R. CONST. (BASIC LAW) preamble, 29 I.L.M. 1511 (April 4,
1990).
181. See Matimak Trading Co., v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76,88 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997).
182. See Windert Watch Co., v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242, 1245
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1246 (citing the British Nationality Act 1948 §1). As subjects of the
United Kingdom, these parties fall within the alienage jurisdiction of the federal courts.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1245.
188. 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954).
189. See Windert, 468 F. Supp. at 1245.
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subjects of the Crown!" The plaintiff argued that because Hong Kong is
a political subdivision of the United Kingdom, citizens of Hong Kong
are necessarily citizens of a foreign state."' The court rejected this
claim," and noted that because the Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
did not cross-reference section 1332(a)(2) to section 1603(a), but did
cross-reference sections 1330 and 1332(4), "foreign state" as used in
section (a)(2) did include political subdivisions.'3 The Windert court
accordingly dismissed the action for lack of alienage jurisdiction.'94
Three years after Windert was decided, the Eastern District of New
York, in Windsor Industries, Inc. v. EACA International Ltd., found that
alienage jurisdiction existed over an action brought against two
corporations from Hong Kong. 5 Unfortunately for the purposes of this
Comment, the court did not give any basis for making this decision.'96 In
Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided that alienage jurisdiction existed over a
corporation from Bermuda, another Crown Colony."l Surprisingly, the
Second Circuit did not address the decisions of the lower courts in
Windert and Windsor, and it did not apply nearly the same depth of
analysis used earlier by the Southern District of New York in Windert.'
The court acknowledged its duty to construe jurisdictional statutes with
precision and fidelity to the intentions of Congress,'" but the court then
stated that "[tihere is no question that diversity jurisdiction exists" under
the statutory and constitutional requirements of section 1332.o The
court ultimately remanded the action to the district court due to a lack of
admiralty jurisdiction.20'
190. See id. at 1246.
191. See id. at 1245.
192. See id. The court dismissed a letter from the Hong Kong consul and relied
instead on the Act of Parliament which did not include Hong Kong in its list of regions
that constitute the United Kingdom. See id.
193. See id. at 1245 & n.3.
194. See id. at 1246.
195. 548 F. Supp. 635, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
196. See id. It appears that the court was not aware of the decision in Windert or of
the subsequent changes made to the de facto standard by Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l
Hosp. See supra notes 158-69, 186-94 and accompanying text.
197. 717 F.2d 731,735 (2d Cir. 1983).
198. See id.
199. See id. at 733.
200. Id. at 735.
201. See id. at 732.
In Great China Trading Co. v. Cimex U.S.A., Inc.,2 the Central
District of California refused to follow Windert and held that a Hong
Kong corporation should be considered a citizen of Great Britain for
purposes of alienage jurisdiction. 3 The court's first reason for its
decision was that Hong Kong corporations owe their allegiance to the
British Crown, despite the fact that the laws of the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong refuse to recognize the fiction of citizenship for
corporations."' The court decided that it would be "neither sensible nor
equitable" to hold that a Hong Kong business could not bring suit in
federal court because it had been organized as a corporation.' The
Great China court's second reason was that although Hong Kong was
not a subdivision of Great Britain, Hong Kong should be considered a
"creature or member" of Great Britain because it is a colony, and since
the plaintiff was a citizen of Hong Kong, the plaintiff should also be
considered a citizen of Great Britain.206
The final reason given by the court in Great China for considering
alienage jurisdiction to be proper over a Hong Kong corporation was
based on the policies behind the creation of alienage jurisdiction.' The
Framers' fear that states would not protect foreigners in accordance with
treaties, and their apprehension that failure to treat the controversies of
aliens on a national level could lead to entanglements with other
sovereigns, was just as relevant when one of the parties is a Hong Kong
corporation as when it is a British corporation or a Hong Kong
partnership&3  The Great China court concluded that the Hong Kong
corporation was a foreign citizen or subject for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction.
In Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen, the Southern District of New
York re-addressed whether a Hong Kong corporation is a foreign citizen
or subject for purposes of section 1332(a)(2).2'0 The Tetra court stated,
in dicta, that it no longer agreed with its earlier decision in Windert.
21
202. No. 80-4221 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1982).
203. See Neil J. Rubenstein, Alienage Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 17 INT'L
LAW. 283, 291-92 n.37 (1983).
204. See id. Individuals that are citizens of the United Kingdom or its colonies are
given the status of a British subject by the British Nationality Act of 1948, but this does
not include corporations. See id.
205. Id. The court noted that if the business had been organized as a partnership
instead of a corporation, it would have been a British subject under the laws of the





210. 584 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
211. See id. The court did not decide whether alienage jurisdiction was proper over
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Applying the standard for de facto recognition that was used in Chang,
22
Judge Werker explained:
It would seem hypertechnical to preclude Hong Kong corporations from
asserting claims in our courts simply because Hong Kong has not been formally
recognized by the United States as a foreign sovereign in its own right .... The
commercial and cultural realities of the modem world dictate that diversity
jurisdiction should be grted to certain governmental entities that have not
been formally recognized.
Corporations from other Crown Colonies had been allowed to proceed in
federal court,2"4 and since the United States has similar relations with all
the Crown Colonies, corporations from Hong Kong should also have
access to federal courts under alienage jurisdiction.
215
Following this decision, courts that addressed alienage jurisdiction
over Crown Colony corporations agreed that the rationales in Tetra
Finance26 and Chang"7 were persuasive.2'8 In Timco Engineering, Inc.
v. Rex & Co., the court noted, in dicta, that it approved of the reasoning
of Tetra Finance, and held that for purposes of section 1332(a)(3),
subject matter jurisdiction exists over an action involving a Hong Kong
citizen and otherwise diverse United States citizens.2 9 In Creative
Distributors, Ltd. v. Sari Niketan, Inc., the court applied the reasoning of
the plaintiff Hong Kong corporations because their claims had been assigned to court
appointed liquidators who were citizens of the United Kingdom, making alienage
jurisdiction clear. See id. at 849.
212. See Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 977 (N.D. Ml1.
1980).
213. Tetra Finance, 584 F. Supp. at 848. In its search for de facto recognition, the
court pointed to the fact that the United States was Hong Kong's largest foreign investor
and trading partner, with total trade between the two countries in 1983 reaching almost
$9 billion. See id.
214. See id.; Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.
1983) (permitting a Bermuda corporation to bring suit under alienage jurisdiction);
Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman Ltd., 713 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding alienage
jurisdiction over a suit against a corporation from the Cayman Islands).
215. See Tetra Finance, 584 F. Supp. at 848. The court concluded that "the
uniqueness of the Hong Kong situation militates strongly in favor of a finding that Hong
Kong is a 'foreign state' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)." Id. at 848.
216. See id.
217. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 975.
218. See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990)
(approving of Tetra Finance in dicta); Creative Distribs., Ltd. v. Sari Niketan, Inc., No.
89-3614C, 1989 WL 105210 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1989); Timco Eng'g, Inc. v. Rex & Co.,
603 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (approving of Tetra Finance in dicta). All of these
courts rejected the reasoning of Windert.
219. See 603 F. Supp. at 930 n.8.
the courts in Chang and Tetra Finance to hold that a corporation from
Hong Kong could bring suit in federal court under section 1332(a)(2).
2
Even when formal recognition is absent, de facto recognition can
develop from an exchange of ambassadors or significant trade relations
or cultural contacts with the foreign state."1 The court in Creative
Distributors found that the great amount of trade and investment
between the United States and Hong Kong was sufficient contact to find
de facto recognition. 'm In Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., the court
agreed with the reasoning of Tetra Finance and decided that jurisdiction
is proper over corporations from the Cayman Islands under section
1332(a)(3).2 The court held that by exercising judicial authority over
the citizens of British Crown colonies, American courts implicate the
relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, thus
justifying alienage jurisdiction.2m The Wilson court concluded that
unless "'form rather than substance"' is to govern, corporations from the
Crown Colonies should be viewed as foreign citizens or subjects for
purposes of section 1332.2
When the district court for the Southern District of New York decided
Windert in 1979, it did not extend de facto recognition beyond situations
similar to that in Murarka v. Bachrack Bros. where official recognition
was imminent.'m The following year, the Chang court expanded the
standard for de facto recognition in order to better accomplish the goals
of the Framers of the Constitution.m Since Chang was decided, every
court that has addressed the issue, including the district court for the
Southern District of New York, has agreed that the reasoning set forth in
Chang is more persuasive and more in accordance with the intentions of
the Framers than the reasoning used by the Windert court.28 These
decisions established that corporations from the Crown Colonies should
have access to the federal courts under alienage jurisdiction because the
Crown Colonies had been de facto recognized by the United States.29
220. See Creative Distributors, 1989 WL 105210, at *2.
221. See id. at *1; (citing Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F. 2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954);
Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 977).
222. See id. at *2.
223. 916 F.2d at 1243.
224. See id, Since this was one of the purposes behind the creation of alienage
jurisdiction, the court felt that corporations from Crown Colonies should have access to
federal courts. See id.
225. Id. (quoting Murarka v. Bachrack Bros.,215 F.2d 547,552 (2d Cir. 1954)).
226. Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
227. See Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 977 n.2 (N.D. 111.
1980).
228. See supra notes 195-225 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 195-225 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 36: 249, 1999] Alienage Jurisdiction
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEV
De facto recognition could be established by an exchange of
ambassadors and other preliminary diplomatic relations in preparation
for official recognition. De facto recognition could also be established
by cultural and commercial relations of such magnitude that to hold.that
the United States does not recognize the entity as a foreign state would
let form rather than substance govern.
V. MATIMAK: A CHANGE IN DIRECTION
A. The District Couri's Decision
Despite the consensus that corporations from the Crown Colonies
should have access to the federal courts under alienage jurisdiction, the
issue was not laid to rest. On August 17, 1995, Matimak Trading
Company, a Hong Kong corporation that had its principal place of
business in Hong Kong, brought an action for breach of contract in the
district court for the Southern District of New York against New York
defendants Albert Khalily and D.A.Y. Kids Sportswear. On June 10,
1996, District Judge Kimba Wood sua sponte raised the issue of whether
jurisdiction was proper, and invited the parties to submit letter briefs
concerning the issue of subject matter jurisdiction31  Finding that
Matimak was not a foreign citizen or subject for purposes of section
1332(a)(2) because Hong Kong has not been recognized by the United
States, Judge Wood dismissed the action without prejudice to its being
refiled in state court.3
Judge Wood relied primarily on Murarka3 in her analysis of whether
Hong Kong had been de facto recognized.2m In Murarka, the court
found de facto recognition due to the imminency of India's
independence in relation to when the complaint was f'led.3s Since Hong
Kong was not about to become a sovereign state in the near future, but
rather was reverting to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, Judge
230. See Appellate Brief Submitted Amicus Curae by the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region in Support of Plaiptiff-Appellant at 3, Matimak
Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 96-9117) (on file vith
author).
231. See Matimak, 936 F. Supp at 152.
232. See id. at 153.
233. Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
234. See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152.
235. See Murarka, 215 F.2d at 551-52.
Wood did not believe Hong Kong deserved de facto recognition." Jim
Hergen, Assistant Legal Supervisor for the State Department, urged the
court to recognize Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state for the
purposes of section 1332(a)(2).31 However, the court relied instead on a
previous letter by Mr. Hergen, submitted to the court during an earlier
case, in which he confirmed that the United States had not recognized
Hong Kong as a sovereign state.238 In her conclusion, Judge Wood found
the reasoning behind Netherlands Shipmortgage,29 Wilson, 40 and Tetra
Finance to be unpersuasive because they were primarily based on
policy and the fact that district courts in the past have heard cases
involving Hong Kong judgments and applied Hong Kong law. 2
B. The Majority Opinion
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
circuit court in a two-to-one decision.2 43 Writing for the majority, Circuit
Judge McLaughlin agreed with Judge Wood's view that a Hong Kong
corporation was not a foreign citizen or subject for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction. 44 In light of the imminent change of sovereignty over Hong
Kong, the court addressed three principle issues: (1) whether Hong Kong
had been recognized by the United States as a foreign state; (2) whether
Matimak was a citizen or subject of the United Kingdom by virtue of
Hong Kong's status as a Crown Colony; and (3) whether alienage
jurisdiction should apply to all non-citizens of the United States. 45
The majority began its opinion by stating that the general rule is that a
foreign state as used for purposes of alienage jurisdiction is one that has
been formally recognized by the executive branch.2 6 Matimak did not
236. See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152-53.
237. See id. at 152.
238. See id. (referring to Dunsky Ltd. v. Judy-Phillipine, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2035
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
239. Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983).
240. Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F. 2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1990).
241. Tetra Finance (HK), Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
242. See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 153 & n.2.
243. See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F. 3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997).
244. See id. at 78.
245. See id. at 79. The last issue, not raised by the parties, was the focus of Judge
Altimari's dissenting opinion and thus also considered by the majority. Id.
246. See id. The court extracted this rule from the previous decision in Iran
Handicraft and Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marian Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1275-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), in which the court focused on whether Iran, undergoing revolutionary
change at the time the complaint was filed, was recognized by the United States as a free
and independent sovereign. The court relied on a letter from the State Department to
conclude that the United States did continue to recognize Iran as an independent
sovereign nation. See id.
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dispute the fact that the United States had not formally recognized Hong
Kong, but contended that various diplomatic and economic ties were
evidence that the United States had de facto recognized Hong Kong as a
foreign state.U7 The court looked to its decision in Murarka v. Bachrack
Bros48 to determine the standard for determining de facto recognition.24
The majority concluded that when the court found that India had de facto
recognition, the Murarka court was doing nothing more than
acknowledging the United States's imminent formal recognition of a
sovereign state. '0 Under this standard for de facto recognition, Hong
Kong could not be de facto recognized because it was merely changing
fealty, not gaining independence."' As additional support for this
conclusion, the court pointed to an amicus brief by the Justice
Department noting that the State Department no longer urged treatment
of Hong Kong as a foreign state.52
The majority of the Matimak court believed that their decision not to
recognize Hong Kong as a foreign state for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction satisfied the rationales underlying alienage jurisdiction'5 3
The court found the primary reason the Framers granted the federal
courts alienage jurisdiction was to avoid entanglements with other
sovereigns that might ensue if the United States failed to treat the legal
controversies of aliens on a national level.' With this reasoning in
247. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80. As a British Crown Colony, Hong Kong
maintained some independence in its international economic and diplomatic
relationships, but remained dependent on the United Kingdom in matters of defense and
foreign affairs. See id. at 81. United States' businesses have invested almost twelve
billion dollars in Hong Kong, making it the United States' twelfth-largest trading partner.
See id.
248. 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
249. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 82. The State Department informed the court of this change in stance
in a footnote. Id. at 82 n.1. The majority stated:
Although we need not resolve this issue here, we note that the State
Department's unexplained change in stance following the district court's
opinion might under different circumstances require further inquiry into its
ulterior motives.... No reason is apparent, and none is suggested, for refusing
to defer to the State Department in this case.
Id. at 82 (citation omitted). Despite its willingness to defer to a footnote in the State
Department's brief, the court refused to defer to the primary argument being made by the
State Department: that Matimak should be treated as a subject of the United Kingdom for
purposes of § 1332(a)(2). See id. at 86.
253. See id. at 82-85.
254. See id. at 82-83; Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Ctr. v. Maijan Int'l Corp.,
mind, the court held that there is no justification for granting citizens of
non-recognized states access to the federal judiciary. 5  "Where the
executive branch determines that a foreign entity is not a 'sovereign,'
there is no threat of entanglement with a sovereign stemming from the
refusal of a federal court to treat that entity's citizen in a national
forum."
256
The court also found that the statutory history of section 1332 supports
the decision that Hong Kong cannot be recognized as a foreign state.2
The court focused its attention on the way the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 affected the subsections of 1332. Congress
defined the term "foreign state" in the new section 1332(a)(4) by
referencing it to section 1603(a), which included subdivisions of a
foreign state." Because Congress did not similarly define "foreign
state" in section 1332(a)(2) at this time, the court decided that section
1332(a)(2) does not include instrumentalities and political subdivisions
when it refers to "foreign states." However, "[i]t does not suggest that
'foreign state,' as undefined in section 1603 or section 1332(a)(2),
should get different meanings."' Therefore, the Second Circuit ruled
that since it has already decided that the foreign state must be recognized
for purposes of section 1332(a)(4), the "foreign state" mentioned in
section 1332(a)(2) must also be recognized. 2
The majority of the court was aware that previous courts had
concluded that Hong Kong is a foreign state for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction, but the court did not find these decisions to be persuasive.2
3
Despite the fact that Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics Ltd.2 4 had
been rejected by many courts up until the time of this decision,55 the
655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (2d Cir. 1988); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1186 (7th Cir.
1980); Van der Schelling v. U.S. News & World Report, 324 F.2d 956, 956 (3d Cir.
1963); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Johnson, supra note 7, at 10-16.
255. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 83.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 83-84.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 83.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 83-84 (emphasis added).
262. See id. at 84.
263. See id. at 84-85. The court criticized the decisions in the following cases:
Tico Eng'g, Inc. v. Rex & Co., 603 F. Supp. 925, 930 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1985), Refco, Inc. v.
Troika hzv. Ltd., 702 F. Supp. 684, 685 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1988), Creative Distributors, Ltd. v.
Sari Niketan, Inc., 1989 WL 105210, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1989), Tetra Finance (HK)
Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), Netherlands Shipmortgage
Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983), Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd.,
916 F.2d 1239, 1242-43 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1990). See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 84-85.
264. 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
265. See supra Part IV.C.
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Matimak court approved of the Windert rationale because it was the only
decision which "conscientiously applied the standards outlined in
Murarka."'
The Justice Department, as amicus, argued that the second issue
before the court should be answered in the affirmative; Matimak should
be treated by the courts as a subject of the United Kingdom for purposes
of section 1332.26 However, the court refused to defer to the executive
branch on this issue, and decided that Matimak was neither a citizen nor
subject of a foreign state.' The court supported its rationale for this
decision by stating that a foreign state is entitled to define who are its
citizens or subjects.2 69 According to the court, the terms "citizen" and
"subject," as used in section 1332(a)(2), do not connote a different status
or allegiance to a foreign state; rather these terms are meant to
encompass persons living under distinct forms of government *0
Because British law does not confer citizenship on corporations formed
under the laws of Hong Kong, Hong Kong corporations are specifically
not citizens and implicitly not subjects of the United Kingdom.21
Finally, the Matimak majority felt that both precedent and policy
arguments failed to support the idea that "foreign citizen or subject" in
section 1332(a)(2) describes all non-citizens of the United States.2n The
statutory grant of alienage jurisdiction can equal, but never exceed the
constitutional grant of jurisdiction.273 The plain language of section
1332(a)(2) does not grant jurisdiction over all non-citizens of the United
States,24 but this may be overcome by clear legislative intent to the
266. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 84-85. Surprisingly, the court never approved nor
disapproved of the new standard for de facto recognition established in Chang v.
Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 506 F. Supp. 975, 978 n.3 (N.D. IM. 1980). See supra
notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
267. SeeMatimak, 118F.3dat86.
268. See id. By deciding in this manner, the court disobeyed the rule it had
approved of earlier that courts should defer to the executive branch when determining
whether the United States has recognized a foreign state. See id. at 83-85.
269. See id. at 85.
270. See id. "'A monarchy has subjects; a republic has citizens."' Id. at 85
(quoting 1 JAMES WM. MooRE Er AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTcE 0.75 (3d ed.
1996)).
271. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85-86.
272. See id. at 86-88.
273. See id. at 86.
274. See id. at 87. The majority noted that the dissent agrees with this statement.
Id.; see also Christine Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and
Alienage Jurisdiction in Light ofAbu-Zeineh v. Federal Labs., Inc., 11 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & P OL'Y 195, 208 (1996).
contrary.2 The majority dismissed the dissent's conclusion that the
Framers intended to invoke alienage jurisdiction over all foreigners,
because the Framers had not contemplated the idea of statelessness and
therefore could not have intended to include stateless people when they
used the phrase "foreign citizens or subjects. 276 Finally, the majority
held that the overriding purpose of alienage jurisdiction, to avoid
entanglements with foreign states and sovereigns, does not justify
extending jurisdiction to stateless persons.2' "If a foreign state has
determined that a person is not entitled to citizenship it should certainly
be unconcerned with that person's treatment in a court in the United
States., 278  The Framers were concerned only with protecting foreign
relations; they were not concerned with possibly affronting individual
foreigners.27 Therefore, the majority concluded that Matimak, a
stateless corporation, is not a citizen or subject of a foreign state under
section 1332(a)(2)2 0
C. The Dissenting Opinion
According to Circuit Judge Altimari, the Matimak majority's decision
is contrary to the purposes of alienage jurisdiction." The fact that the
First Congress used the terms "foreigner" and "alien" instead of
"subject" and "citizen" in the Judiciary Act of 1789 strongly suggests
that the Framers intended to grant alienage jurisdiction to all aliens
involved in litigation with citizens of the United States.8 2 The Framers
275. SeeMatinak, 118F.3dat87.
276. See id. The court reasoned:
The "idea of statelessnesss" was simply not ih [the Framers]
"contemplation.... " The basic assumption of the framers-if indeed it was
ever valid-no longer holds true: not every "foreigner" is a citizen or subject
of some foreign state. As noted [earlier], the notion of statelessness is now
well embedded in international law. Accordingly, the dissent's conclusion that
the drafters in the late-eighteenth century intended that all "foreigners,"
including stateless persons, be entitled to invoke alienage jurisdiction over a
United States citizen ignores the fact that the term in 1787 did not include
stateless persons-a category of people unknown to the drafters of the
Constitution.
Id. This author questions the logic of this argument. If stateless persons are not citizens
of the United States, then they are foreigners. If the Framers meant to include all
foreigners, then they would have included stateless persons too, because stateless
persons are a type of foreigner. The argument used by the majority here seems to be
based on circular logic.
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 88.
280. See id.
281. See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
282. See id. at 89. When Congress amended the Act, it gave no indication that it
intended to limit federal jurisdiction. See id.
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likely intended to encompass anyone who was not a citizen of the United
States with the phrase "citizens or subjects of foreign states. ' 'n3 Judge
Altimari commented that American courts have wrongly excluded
stateless persons from the federal courts, and should not extend this bar
to stateless corporations.'" The primary reason for alienage jurisdiction
was to provide foreigners a neutral forum, thus avoiding the appearance
of injustice and grounds for resentment by other nations. Judge
Altimari warned that the decision of the majority risked antagonizing
two world forces, the United Kingdom and China, because they both
have an interest in protecting Hong Kong interests.2
6
Judge Altimari did not believe it was wise to continue deferring to
foreign law to determine who foreign citizens are for purposes of
alienage jurisdiction.' "We would not allow foreign law to grant
privileges in the United States, why should we allow foreign law to deny
privileges afforded under the Constitution?"2n Judge Altimari warned
that by basing jurisdiction on another country's definition of its
citizenry, American courts may unintentionally promote discrimination
against certain classes of people or entities.' 9
Judge Altimari also dissented because he felt that Hong Kong had
been recognized by the United States . Winder?'1 and Iran
Handicraft,29 the cases primarily relied upon by the majority, used
"form" rather than "substance."
293 Windert's reaspning was challenged
and rejected by subsequent cases.24  Although the executive branch
withdrew support for de facto recognition of Hong Kong, it urged the
283. See id.
284. See id. "A stateless corporation is an oxymoron" because corporations cannot
be created without the permission of a state. Id.
285. See id. at 88.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 89. In Murarka, the court held that every country has the right to
determine who its nationals are, and other nations should accept this determination. See
Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1954).
288. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 89 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
289. See id. at 90. Judge Altimari was troubled by Chinese laws that, after June 30,
1997, will differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic Chinese residents of Hong Kong
and do not grant Chinese citizenship to Hong Kong corporations. See id.
290. See id. at 90-91.
291. Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).




court to recognize Hong Kong as a subject of the United Kingdom, and
the majority should have deferred to this decision. 5 The United States'
strong interest in Hong Kong, combined with the explicit request to
permit Matimak to litigate in the federal courts, led Judge Altimari to
dissent from the majority opinion."6
D. Analyzing the Matimak Decision
The decision of the Second Circuit in Matimak has the potential to
cause irreparable damage to U.S. trade relations. Corporations located
in foreign locales that have not been recognized by the United States
have cause to be wary of conducting business with parties from the
United States, and vice versa. If any disputes arise during the business
relationship, the wronged party may be unable to bring.an action in the
federal courts of the United States. The foreign corporation could still
bring an action in a state court, however this would risk appearing in a
court where the American business would have home-court advantage.
In a perfect world, the state courts would be free of prejudice against
non-local parties; state courts would be as impartial as federal courts.
However, the world is far from perfect.
[L]ocal bias is not dead. To be sure, increased transportation,
communication, travel and interstate business have homogenized the country
greatly. But, it is Pollyannish to conclude that regional bias no longer exists.
Indeed, well-publicized cases clearly suggest local bias. Eve~if such bias ha[s]
abated, there is still a widespread apprehension of local bias.
One reason federal judges tend to be less biased than state judges is
because they do not have to accede to public opinion to be reelected.
Another reason may be that they have more legal experience than state
judges and more exposure to foreign litigants. Although the federal
courts may also be biased in favor of American parties, on the whole,
federal judges are better qualified than state judges to hear disputes
involving foreign litigants.2 8 Federal judges also have a better support
staff than most state court judges. 9 Finally, the federal court jury is
drawn from a wider geographical area, which should tend to lessen the
potential for local bias.3°°
The implications of the Matimak decision weigh" most heavily on
295. See id.
296. See id. at 92.
297. MOORE, supra note 4, § 102 app. 03(2).
298. See id.
299. See id. Federal judges are often assisted by law clerks, magistrates and other
personnel not available in state courts. See id.
300. See id.
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Hong Kong corporations; however, the decision could lead to similar
decisions that keep corporations from other Crown Colonies out of the
federal courts. Hong Kong has not been a British Crown Colony since
June 30, 1997.0' It is now a Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China.' However, Hong Kong corporations
remain citizens of Hong Kong, and Chinese law does not recognize
Hong Kong corporations as Chinese citizens or subjects.' Accordingly,
Hong Kong corporations are still not recognized by the United States as
foreign citizens or subjects under the reasoning established in
Matimak 4 Corporations from the remaining British Crown Colonies
possess essentially the same relationship with the United States as Hong
Kong did when Matimak was initiated. If any difference exists, it is that
these colonies have no plans for changing fealty in the near future.
These colonies have similar governments, similar sovereignty, and
similar non-governmental contacts with the United States. Accordingly,
the Matimak decision suggests that corporations from these colonies
should be restricted from using alienage jurisdiction to enter the federal
courts. American courts had given access to these corporations,
however, the Matimak decision expressly disapproved of the rationale
behind those decisionsY35 Since Matimak was decided, its reasoning has
already been used to deny subject matter jurisdiction when alienage
jurisdiction is based on the presence of a Bermuda corporation.30
Prohibiting access to the federal courts for corporations from Hong
Kong and the remaining Crown Colonies is no small matter. Hong
Kong is the United States' twelfth largest trading partner. In 1996, the
United States' total exports to Hong Kong were valued at $15.5 billion,
and total imports from Hong Kong were valued at $6.9 billion.m
301. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 5701(1)(B) (West Supp. 1998).
302. See H.K.S.A.R. CONST. (BAsIc LAW) preamble, 29 I.L.M. 1511 (adopted
April 4, 1990).
303. See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 90 (2nd Cir. 1997).
304. See id.
305. See id. at 85 (rejecting Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d
731 (2d Cir. 1983) and Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.
1989)).
306. See Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda (N.Y.) Ltd., No. 96-Civ-7885 (JFK), 1998
WL 557595 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998).
307. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81.
308. See Appellate Brief Submitted Amicus Curae by the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Matimak
Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 96-9117) (on file with
author). In addition to these totals, there is substantial investment between the two
Matimak could affect over 480,000 corporations that are registered under
Hong Kong's Companies Registry.3 The United States' trade with the
remaining Crown Colonies is not nearly as substantial as with Hong
Kong, however it is still far from insignificant. In 1997, the United
States' exports to the Cayman Islands totaled $270.4 billion, exports to
the British Virgin Islands totaled $64.7 million, and exports to Bermuda
totaled $338.1 million.310 Imports from the Cayman Islands amounted to
$19.6 million; imports from the British Virgin Islands totaled $16.9
million; and imports from Bermuda totaled $29.8 million."' More
businesses are incorporated under the laws of these Crown Colonies
every year due to the economic advantages offered by these states. At
this time, Bermuda has over 10,000 registered corporations and the
Cayman Islands has almost 40,000.12 These statistics reveal that the
Matimak decision could have a terribly large impact on United States'
trade. The potential consequences of denying these stateless
corporations access to federal courts reveals the importance in carefully
examining the appropriateness of the Matimak decision, in particular,
and alienage jurisdiction in general.
The Framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom in providing a
neutral forum for foreign parties to enforce their rights against citizens
of the United States. The majority in Matimak recognized the Framers'
ultimate goal of creating a neutral forum, but like almost every court
since Blair Holdings,"3 the majority mistook the reason the Framers
found it necessary to set such a goal. In Blair Holdings, the court relied
primarily on Hamilton's comments in The Federalist Papers to reach the
conclusion that the Framers' primary concern was to avoid
entanglements with other sovereigns.314 The Blair Holdings court failed
to examine comments by other Framers, or consider the circumstances in
which these comments were made." If it had done this, the Blair
Holdings court would have realized that the Framers were at least
equally concerned with encouraging foreign businesses to engage in
trade with American businesses. Like lemmings going over a cliff, the
countries. See id.
309. See id. at 5.
310. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics (visited March 28, 1998)
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-tradelsitcll1997.htm>.
311. See id.
312. See Appellate Brief Submitted Amicus Curae by the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5 n.1, Matimak
Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 96-9117) (on file with
author).
313. Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein, 133 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
314. See id. at 500.
315. See id.
316. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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courts following Blair Holdings faithfully accepted its findings without
personally investigating the intentions of the Framers."'
Stateless parties are being denied access to the federal courts because
any injustice they may suffer in the courts will not implicate retribution
by a foreign sovereign. However, stateless corporations should be given
access to a neutral federal judiciary because bias against them may affect
their willingness to engage in commerce with American businesses.
Considering the diplomatic and military strength of the United States as
it enters the twenty-first century, the fear that a state court's bias against
a foreign party would entangle the entire Union in a conflict with
another sovereign is unfounded."8 However, the fear that bias against
foreign parties could chill foreign commerce should still affect the
treatment of foreign parties in American courts. By providing foreigners
a federal forum where their grievances may be heard without bias, the
United States has grown into a world superpower. Chief Judge John
Parker stated:
No power exercised under the Constitution has, in my judgement, had
greater influence in welding these United States into a single nation; nothing has
done more to foster interstate commerce and communication and the
uninterrupted flow of capital for investment into the various parts of the Union;
and nothing has bWn so potent in sustaining the public credit and the sanctity of
private contracts.
The Matimak court failed to address this important justification for
alienage jurisdiction, resulting in a decision that goes against the very
317. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
318. This fear was most likely justified in the late eighteenth century, when the
United States was a weak country just getting its feet on the ground.
319. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A. J.
433, 437 (1932). In his comments on diversity jurisdiction in general, Chief Justice Taft
said:
I venture to think that there may be a strong dissent from the view that
danger of local prejudice in state courts against non-resident is at an end....
The material question is not so much whether the justice administered is
actually impartial and fair, as it is whether it is thought to be so by those who
are considering the wisdom of investing their capital in states where capital is
needed for the promotion of enterprises and industrial and commercial
progress.... [N]o single element in our government system has done so much
to secure capital for the legitimate development of enterprises throughout the
West and South as the existence of federal courts there, with a jurisdiction to
hear diverse citizenship cases.
Hon. William H. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in
Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 604 (1922).
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reasons alienage jurisdiction was created in the first place."'
Corporations from Hong Kong and the remaining Crown Colonies may
hesitate before doing business with an American party because, if a
dispute arises, the foreign corporation may not have the assurance of
neutrality which the federal courts afford. They can still bring an action
in the state courts, however the fear still exists today that state courts
will not be as neutral.
The statutory grant of alienage jurisdiction, first codified by the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and now found at 28 U.S.C. section 1332(a)(2),
was intended by Congress to encompass all non-citizens of the United
States. The Matimak decision failed to properly consider the full scope
of these statutes.32' Even if the stateless parties are not included in the
plain language of the Act, Congress intended to extend alienage
jurisdiction as far as the Constitution permits, which includes stateless
parties.32
Matimak, in determining the standard for de facto recognition of a
foreign state, primarily relied on Murarka,3" the first case to use de facto
recognition.3 The majority decided that de facto jurisdiction must be
limited to situations similar to those in Murarka: where official
recognition of the foreign state was imminent3 5 The Chang court had
extended the de facto standard to situations where commercial and
cultural ties reflect recognition,326 but the Matimak court failed to address
this change in the de facto standard.32 The Chang court is not in a
jurisdiction which the Second Circuit reviews, but the district court for
the Southern District of New York approved of the Chang rationale in
Tetra Finance,32 and the Matimak court should have considered Chang
before it held that the Tetra Finance decision was unpersuasive. 9 The
reasoning of the Chang court was more in accord with the intentions of
the Framers than that of the Murarka court, in that it considered the
commercial ties between the United States and the foreign state.330 The
Matimak court should have addressed this decision when it was
determining whether de facto jurisdiction of Hong Kong exists.
320. See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 82-85 (2nd Cir. 1997).
321. See id. at 86-87.
322. See id. at 86; see also supra Part D.
323. Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954).
324. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80-5.
325. See id. at 80.
326. See Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 977 (N.D. M11.
1980).
327. See Matimak, 118, F.3d at 84-85.
328. Tetra Finance (H[-) Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847, 848 (1984).
329. See Matimak, 118, F.3d at 85.
330. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 977 n.2.
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One commentator has concluded that the Matimak decision
concerning whether Hong Kong has been de facto recognized was
supported by legal precedent.33' However, like the majority in Matimak,
that commentator has failed to consider the standard for de facto
recognition established in Chang332 and approved in Tetra Finance333 and
Wilson.M
In Murarka, the court established de facto recognition in order that
"form rather than substance" is not permitted to govern.135 By limiting
de facto recognition to the facts in Murarka, the Second Circuit has
failed to achieve this ultimate goal of the Murarka court. De facto
recognition must be flexible to accommodate the changing needs of the
United States. It should be used to avoid the danger created when a
foreign litigant is not given access to the federal courts, due to the fact
that the United States has not formally recognized a foreign state as a
sovereign and independent entity.
The Matimak decision has already resulted in the exclusion of more
foreign corporations from federal courts. In KoehIer v. Bank of
Bermuda, the Southern District of New York applied the principles of
Matimak to hold that a Bermuda corporation could not be sued in federal
court under alienage jurisdiction. Upon deciding that Matimak
controls, the court held that the Bermuda corporations were not citizens
of a foreign state for purposes of alienage jurisdiction.337 Additionally,
in Inarco International Bank v. Lazard Freres & Co., the Southern
District of New York suggested that corporations from Aruba also could
not bring suit in federal court pursuant to section 1332(a)(2).3 ' Aruba is
331. See Bradford Williams, The Aftermath of Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily: Is
the American Legal System Ready for Global Interdependence?, 23 N.C. J. OF INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 201,222-23 (1997).
332. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 977.
333. See Tetra Finance, 584 F. Supp. at 848.
334. See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir.
1990).
335. Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954).
336. See Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda; No. 96-Civ-7885 (JFK), 1998 WL 557595,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998).
337. See id. The U.S. Department of State notified the court that "the U.S. does not
regard the Islands of Bermuda as an independent sovereign nation or foreign state." Id.
See also Klein v. Marriott Int'l, Nos. 98-Civ-1591(WCC), 98-Civ-2356(WCC), 98-Civ-
2357(WCC), 1999 WL 27201, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1999) (citing Koehler and
Matimak in holding that defendant Bermuda corporation was not a citizen or subject of a
foreign state for purposes of section 1332(a)(3)).
338. See Iuarco Int'l Bank v. Lazard Freres & Co., No. 97-Civ-0378 (DAB), 1998
a dependency of the Netherlands, and as such it is not recognized as an
independent foreign state.339 After suggesting in dicta that, pursuant to
Matimak, alienage jurisdiction may be absent, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint on other grounds.
The Supreme Court should address this issue before any more actions
are dismissed for lack of alienage jurisdiction. The fact that jurisdictions
have split in deciding whether corporations from semi-autonomous
states may enter the federal courts, and the fact that Matimak could have
a serious chilling effect on United States trade with these foreign states,
makes the issue ripe for the Court's attention.
In the meantime, Congress should also take action to resolve this
problem. Congress has never expressly defined "citizen or subject of a
foreign state." This would be a wise decision because as time passes,
new types of foreigners may appear which Congress cannot anticipate
and this issue would return. The best way for Congress to resolve the
issue would be to amend section 1332(a)(2). Congress could satisfy the
intentions of the Framers and preserve flexibility for the future by
changing section 1332(a)(2) to read "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs,
and is between citizens of a State and foreign citizens or subjects." By
phrasing the statutory grant of alienage jurisdiction in this manner,
Congress will more closely follow the language of the Constitution. By
removing "state" from the statute, all foreigners will have access to the
federal courts regardless of where they are from.
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority in Matimak followed the path of prior courts in
examining the intentions of the Framers concerning alienage
jurisdiction, and ended up in the wrong place. As a result of Matimak,
the standard for de facto recognition has been set back to a standard
established in 1954.3" At a time when the court should be thinking
about how its decisions will implicate the United States in the coming
millennium, the Matimak decision was disregarded by contemporary
views about the nature of alienage jurisdiction. By examining the words
of the Framers, and the context in which they spoke, it is clear that their
primary reason for providing the federal courts with alienage jurisdiction
WL 427618 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998).
339. See id.at*l.
340. See id. at *2.
341. The standard has been set back to that in Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d
547 (2d Cir. 1954).
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was not solely to avoid foreign entanglements. The Framers wished to
protect and encourage United States' foreign commerce. Avoiding
entanglements with foreign sovereigns was clearly considered important
by Hamilton, but by relying solely on his comments in The Federalist
Papers, the court has not realized the full purpose of alienage
jurisdiction. In establishing alienage jurisdiction, the Framers clearly
meant to encompass all non-citizens of the United States within the
phrase "foreign citizens or subjects." By relying on Murarka to
determine the standards for de facto recognition, the court improperly
disregarded four decades of change in the law. Murarka established de
facto recognition; it did not set its limits. By recognizing commercial
and cultural ties as sufficient contact to justify de facto recognition, the
courts in Chang and Tetra Finance accomplished the goals of the
Framers when they established alienage jurisdiction.
"Stateless corporations" should not be denied access to the federal
judiciary under alienage jurisdiction. The Supreme Court should use the
next available opportunity to overrule the decision of the Second Circuit
in Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily. Alternatively, Congress should
amend section 1332(a)(2) to prevent further misinterpretations of
alienage jurisdiction. These changes need to be made before the United
States's foreign trade relations are irreparably harmed.
FRANK ERIC MARCHETnI
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